Archive for the 'Inklings' Category

Review: Dangerous Idea

Don June 24th, 2009

This review appeared in Philosophia Christi, 6:2 (2004): 375-77.

 

Victor Reppert, C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason.  Downers Grove, Il.:  InterVarsity Press, 2003, 132pp., pbk.

 

C. S. Lewis’s famous debate with Elizabeth Anscombe at the Oxford Socratic club over the validity of his argument in Miracles for the self-defeating status of naturalism may or may not have produced much clarification of the issues, but it definitely produced a tendentious interpretation of Lewis’s career:  that he was so mortified at being defeated that he gave up rational apologetics from then on.  Never mind that many of the people who were present either thought Lewis had won or that the debate was a draw; never mind the fact that he revised the relevant chapter in a later edition of Miracles to meet Anscombe’s objections and published several subsequent essays on apologetics.  Why let mere facts stand in the way of a good myth?   

Victor Reppert first destroyed the “Anscombe Myth” in “The Lewis-Anscombe Controversy: A Discussion of the Issues,” Christian Scholar’s Review 19:2 (1989).  It is good to see that discussion brought forward for a new generation of readers.  If Reppert had done nothing else, he would have performed a valuable service here.  It is to be hoped that more people will read his complete review of the evidence in the new book and that this particular bit of arrant nonsense will finally be put to rest.  But Reppert’s goal is much broader:  to bring Lewis’s argument for theism up to date and see how it fares after all these years.  He concludes that the argument from reason is still a good one.

Reppert begins with his review of the Lewis-Anscombe debate and then moves on to a discussion of a healthy approach to apologetics, rejecting fideism (just believe) and “strong rationalism” (Christian truth is so evident that any rational person should accept it) in favor of “critical rationalism” (Christian apologists can show that Christianity is a reasonable option).  I find myself wishing there were a middle position between his “strong rationalism” and “critical rationalism.”  He points out well the problems with strong rationalism of the Josh McDowell type.  But . . . if Christianity is really true, the universe ought in the final analysis to reflect that truth. One doesn’t want to be able to offer nothing more than one reasonable alternative among many.  I feel this problem at the end of the book, where I believe Reppert has earned the right to be at least a bit less tentative than he is.  Naturalists really can’t defend naturalism without cutting off the limb they are wanting to sit on . . . but Reppert is not willing to say that this is irrational?  How self defeating must a position be before we are willing to say so? 

Also, it doesn’t seem to me possible to give a complete account of the issues surrounding apologetic method without dealing with 1 Cor. 2:14.  It would seem that one would have to get past that verse somehow in order to see the amount of irrationality as being as evenly distributed between believers and non-believers as Reppert seems to imply.  Or, to put it more accurately, I should say that irrationality may well be tragically fairly evenly distributed in fact, (I unfortunately think he is right about that), but there should be a difference in theory.  Christians don’t have to be as irrational as they are; non-Christians do.  They have no choice but to be irrational at some point, because they have set themselves against the rational universe that God actually made.  I think this is a pretty important distinction that I wish had come out more clearly.

When Reppert turns to the argument from reason itself, he does a good job of guiding us through the issues.  The argument on p. 68 is especially fine.  “If a materialist says that she believes in materialism because she perceives the reasons for believing it, then I take it she is committed to the existence of reasons,” and therefore has to explain how they can exist in a materialist universe.  It is really the same argument that Socrates used at his defense:  How can you believe in flute playing and not believe in flutes?  How can you believe in divine effects and not believe in the gods?  Reppert has updated it and applied it to the existence of reasons in a useful and persuasive manner.  His refutation on pp. 100-101 of the notion that reason could have been produced by natural selection is also good.  The “inadequacy objection,” which argues that non-scientific explanations do not explain, is one of the biggest hurdles the argument from reason has to face.  Reppert’s question on p. 111 is an excellent response to it:  “Is it more dangerous to the scientific enterprise to suggest that a comprehensive “scientific” account of cognition cannot be correct, or to suggest that truth should not be the goal of our rational deliberations?”    That is a question that we need ask more insistently.

When I tried to update Lewis’s argument in”Some Propositions for a Theistic Argument,” Bulletin of the Evangelical Philosophical Society, 14:1 (1991): 70-81, I focused on the fact that a naturalistic universe is by definition a deterministic universe.  The laws of physics determine everything because the universe, being uncaused, exists a se and therefore by definition cannot be other than it is.  It seems to me that this fact needs to be stressed, for it provides a simpler way of defeating Anscombe’s objections.  It really doesn’t matter whether chains of reasoning caused by non-rational causes can happen to have been valid or not, unless we are free to choose between them on a non-deterministic basis.  If nobody can help believing what he believes, whether it be rational or irrational, then nobody is in a position to distinguish between warranted and unwarranted truth claims or to urge his own truth claims with any moral force.  Valid chains of reasoning might occur, but nobody–including the naturalist making truth claims for naturalism–would be in a position to benefit from them.  Reppert implies all of this when he talks about the problem of knowing that one is rational, but it seems to me that his case would be strengthened by bringing it out more clearly.

Over all this is a very fine book, one of the few books on Lewis that actually contributes something useful to our knowledge of him and our understanding of the things he talked about.  I hope it will have the success it deserves.

 

Donald T. Williams

Toccoa Falls College

Lewis Agonistes

Don June 22nd, 2009

This review was published in Mythprint 43:9 (September 2006): 11-12.

 

Louis Markos, Lewis Agonistes: How C. S. Lewis can Train us to Wrestle with the Modern and Postmodern World.  Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2003.  ISBN 080542778-3, pb, xv + 174 pp., $19.99.

 

From Chad Walsh’s pioneering C. S. Lewis: Apostle to the Skeptics (1949) to Michael Aeschliman’s The Restitution of Man: C. S. Lewis and the Case against Scientism (1983) to John Beversluis’s C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (1985) to Scott Burson and Jerry Walls’ C. S. Lewis and Francis Schaeffer: Lessons for a New Century from the most Influential Apologists of our Time (1998) to Victor Reppert’s C. S. Lewis’s Dangerous Idea: In Defense of the Argument from Reason (2002), a number of substantial attempts have been made to evaluate C. S. Lewis as a Christian apologist.  In some ways the best of these studies is Lewis Agonistes by Louis Markos, professor of English at Houston Baptist University.  The title means “Lewis the wrestler,” from the Greek agwn (agon), an athletic contest or struggle.  It nicely captures the fact that for Lewis, apologetics was not simply a polite academic hobby, but rather a phase of the battle of light against darkness, a struggle for minds and hearts with the eternal souls of men and women at stake. 

            As a general guide to Lewis’s apologetic work, Lewis Agonistes is clearly the class of the field.  Walsh is dated, Beversluis unsympathetic and tendentious, Aeschliman and Reppert excellent but limited in scope to one issue or argument.  Markos is comprehensive, covering not only the standard nonfiction works (Mere Christianity, Miracles, Problem of Pain, etc.) but also showing how Lewis’s fiction, literary scholarship, and works such as Surprised by Joy and A Grief Observed contribute to a holistic approach in which the modern estrangement between Reason and Imagination is overcome.  The book is organized thematically, first covering Lewis’s preparation for his wrestling in both education and life experience and then analyzing his response to five challenges:  science and the modernist paradigm, the new age and neopaganism, evil and suffering, the meaning of art and language, and heaven and hell.  The emphasis is not so much on Lewis’s arguments in themselves (which, however valid, must be constantly updated) as on Lewis as a role model for our own apologetic wrestling.  In the process Markos gets beyond the typical caricature of Lewis as a reactionary to elucidate the wholeness of his approach, which responds to the challenges of modernity “both by means of a reactive defense that takes us back to an older, medieval countervision and a proactive offense that looks ahead to a new synthesis of ancient and modern” (x).

            The general excellence of Markos’s treatment is marred by an occasional yielding to the temptation to psychologize, speculating about the sources of Lewis’s own need to wrestle toward a synthesis of Reason and Imagination.  I also think he misses the point in his attempt to show how Lewis might have responded to Postmodern forms of intellectual nihilism such as Deconstruction.  Markos contrasts “conservative Evangelicals who argue that language is meaningful because it is not slippery” with “liberal theorists who claim that it is slippery and therefore meaningless.”  He finds a middle way in “poetry that cries out on the rooftops that language is more meaningful precisely because it is slippery” (130).  But why use the word “slippery,” which concedes too much, when a more positive description like “rich” would have achieved his purpose equally well?  One can’t resist imagining a Lewisian “Distinguo!” being thundered over a mug of Eagle and Child beer at that point.  For a much better treatment of this question see Bruce Edwards’ outstanding study, A Rhetoric of Reading: C. S. Lewis’s Defense of Western Literacy (1986).

            These are about the only flaws I can find in a very fine work, except the fact that a book of this much intellectual substance rather demands the bibliography and index which are inexplicably missing at the end.  Markos avoids the endless dreary summarizing and rehashing which makes most secondary works on Lewis a waste of time that would have been better spent re-reading (or reading) Lewis and gives us readable analysis that is profitable to follow even when I think it is wrong.  And it is mostly right.

Reviewed by Donald T. Williams, PhD 

Critique Critiqued

Don May 20th, 2009

Note:  This review was published in Mythlore: The Journal of the Mythopoeic Society 105/106, Spring/Summer 2009): 168-70. 

C. S. LEWIS AND THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL RELIGION.  Revised and Updated.  John Beversluis.  Amherst, N. Y.:  Prometheus Books, 2007. 363 pp.  $20.00, pbk.  ISBN 978-1-59102-3.

 

Surely one of the most controversial books in the history of Lewis studies was the first edition of John Beversluis’s C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, originally published by Eerdmans in 1985.  Billing itself as the only book-length critical study of Lewis’s rational apologetic for Christian faith, it concluded that none of his arguments succeeded.  Reviewing the first edition in Mythlore 43 (Autumn 1985), Nancy-Lou Patterson called it “as waspish a work” as it had ever been her “disagreeable task to review,” concluding that the faith, “including its reasoned elements” would survive the book (42).  Patterson was right: the first edition sometimes gave the impression that Beversluis thought accusing Lewis of a fallacy was equivalent to demonstrating that he had committed it.  Few readers who had appreciated Lewis’s apologetic works were convinced by Beversluis’s arguments.

 

Now we have a new revised, updated, and expanded edition.  It has already caused much exultation on atheist websites and much dismissive eye-rolling among Lewis fans.  Neither reaction is justified. 

Beversluis has responded to his critics, continued his own thinking, and rewritten each section to the point that this version is almost a completely new book.  In the process, he has strengthened his presentation considerably.  While in the end I still find it mostly unconvincing, it does keep its promise to provide the strongest sustained critique of Lewis’s apologetic on the market.  As such it performs a valuable service.  Those who wish to continue using updated versions of Lewis’s arguments for Christian theism will have to get past Beversluis in order to do so with credibility, and their arguments will be stronger for the exercise.

 

Beversluis sets out to take seriously Lewis’s statement in Mere Christianity that he does not ask anyone to accept Christianity “if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it.”  Beversluis approves of Lewis for demanding evidence and wants to know if he has succeeded in showing that the best reasoning supports Christian faith.  Beversluis concludes that Lewis’s own best reasoning fails to do so.  While he examines several of Lewis’s arguments—the argument from desire, the moral argument for theism, the “trilemma” argument for the deity of Christ, the argument from reason for the self-refuting character of naturalism, Lewis’s theodicy, etc.—in great detail, his objections can be summarized in two points.  First, the “apparent cogency of [Lewis’s] arguments depends on his rhetoric rather than on his logic” (20).  Lewis was such a good writer that people are carried away by his words and do not notice the fallacies being committed under their cover.  Second, Lewis’s arguments are fallacious, and his besetting fallacy is the False Dilemma.  Lewis will say that there are only two (or three) choices, refute one, and thus seem to leave Christian theism standing in sole possession of the field; but in reality, there are other alternatives he has not considered, and the one he is rejecting is a straw man.  

It should be immediately obvious to Beversluis’s readers that his first criticism of Lewis is valid only if, and only to the extent that, the second is upheld.  It is hardly a fault to write well unless that writing can be shown to be in the service of error.  The details of the second criticism will likely be debated in the journals for some time.  The question will be whether the additional alternatives Beversluis tries to posit do not in fact ultimately reduce to the set of choices that Lewis’s more incisive analysis had set before us in the first place.  In most cases, I believe that they do. 

For example, Beversluis argues that Lewis’s refutation of moral subjectivism is vitiated by the fact that he treats it as a single genus, when actually “there are more sophisticated and nuanced versions that . . . cannot be disposed of so easily” (83).  The example we are offered is Hume’s theory of morals as based on human feeling, which Beversluis claims is not susceptible to Lewis’s “loose-cannon generalizations” (87).  Well, I think it is.  In fact, I think it can be doubted whether Hume’s view is properly a theory of ethics at all, as it has absolutely no answer to Lewis’s charge that subjectivist ethics is unable to account for the word “ought.”  When the philosophical jargon is stripped away from the allegedly “more nuanced” views, it is not clear at all to me that Beversluis has made his charge of False Dilemma stick rather than just muddying the water.  The other forms of subjectivism remain species of the genus. 

In the discussion of the Trilemma (“Lord/Liar/Lunatic”—not Lewis’s words, by the way), the alleged missed alternatives include the possibility that Jesus did not actually say or mean the statements on which the argument is based, and that a person could be mistaken about being God and still be a great moral teacher.  In the first case, Beversluis himself commits the fallacies of dicto simpliciter and ad verecundiam, telling us that “All mainstream New Testament scholars agree that the synoptic Gospels are fragmentary, episodic, internally inconsistent, and written by people who were not eyewitnesses” (123).  All?  That generalization has never been true, and it is less true now than it has ever been.  (See Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, Eerdmans, 2006, as just one counter-example.)   Even if the “experts” were in fact unanimous, it would not make them right.  And surely one can be mistaken about a great many things, including one’s own identity, and still be a good moral teacher.  But we are asked now to believe that a person could wrongly think he is the Creator of the Universe, the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, eternal Being who thundered from Sinai now incarnate in human flesh, and still retain any credibility on anything else he might say!  Beversluis argues that Jesus’ moral statements would still be true even if he were a lunatic; but this misses the point completely.  Lewis assumes the validity of the teaching; it is the credibility of the Teacher that is on trial.  To say the least, I do not find Beversluis’s “alternatives” to Lewis’s allegedly prematurely limited choices terribly impressive.

 

What my best reasoning tells me at the end of the day is that people who want to escape the conclusions of Christian theism can always find a loophole that will satisfy them.  John Beversluis is particularly good at doing so.  It does not follow that theism is false or that Lewis’s arguments for it are bad.  Whether you agree with me or with Beversluis about Lewis’s arguments, one thing is certain: the discussion is sure to continue.  I for one look forward to that.

 

Donald T. Williams         

  

Review: “Beowulf”

Don May 4th, 2009

REVIEW: “BEOWULF”A Robert Zemeckis Film with Screenplay by Neil Gaiman and Roger AvaryReleased December, 2007 

I am not even going to get started on the differences in plot between the new Beowulf movie and the original poem; or even the differences in the characters. If a student watched this movie to learn about Beowulf for his English class and tried to substitute that viewing for reading the book, he would most deservedly fail. But all that I will not touch, nor will I comment on the annoying inconsistency in how realistic the various computer-generated humans look, being studious of brevity. Instead, let me try to address the differences in philosophy or world view between the two works.

 The poem was written by a medieval Anglo-Saxon Christian who used Beowulf’s character to address issues of Christ and culture that still resonate with us today. What does accepting Christianity mean to Anglo-Saxon heirs of the Germanic tribal tradition of Norse gods and a heroic warrior culture who still live in a very dangerous world? The poet went out of his way to set up parallels between Beowulf and Christ: Beowulf’s “baptism” in the mere, his apparent death at the “ninth hour,” his subsequent “resurrection,” his fight with a dragon at which he has twelve companions, one of which is a traitor and eleven of which abandon him (with the exception of Wiglaf, who thus represents John the beloved disciple), etc.

The poet’s point is that Beowulf is the modern model for the Christ-like man. This theme seems strange until you compare Beowulf with the other heroes of that culture. It often doesn’t come across to today’s reader because we are no longer familiar with the old warrior culture. But Beowulf stands out as one who does not slay his kin out of drunkenness or for personal gain. He only fights to defend the weak and innocent. And when he gives his Battle Boast, he strikes a radically new note. Rather than boasting about how his own prowess and superiority will win the day, he says, “I will fight Grendel, and may the true God [not Fate, as in the movie] then assign victory to whoever pleases him.” Beowulf’s boast gives the ultimate glory if he wins to God, not to himself. The word may sound ironic to us moderns, but Beowulf stands out from his contemporaries like a sore thumb as precisely meek. Beowulf is the Christ-like hero that the poet thinks his generation needs, because he acknowledges his strength as a gift from God, uses it for good, not personal gain or power, and gives the glory to God. 

 

This reading of Beowulf’s character and of the poem that came down to us is confirmed by a comparison with that other brilliant Anglo-Saxon portrayal of Christ as hero, “The Dream of the Rood.”  There, far from being a passive victim, Christ is the one supremely in control of what is happening at the crucifixion.  It is his strength that enables the Cross itself to bear him, and as a conquering hero he “mounted the cross to redeem mankind” (emphasis added).  If that is the portrait of Christ that resonated with Anglo-Saxon Christians, then Beowulf is the portrait of the Christ-like man.

 

The movie goes out of its way to contradict the message of the poem at every possible point. There is no sense in acknowledging or praying to the gods–especially the “new Roman god, Christ”–because the gods will not do anything for us that we don’t do for ourselves. Far from being a Christ-like hero, Beowulf sells his soul to Grendel’s mother for absolute power and then lies about having killed her when he returns from the mere. The movie’s writers apparently believe that real personal integrity is just inconceivable, for the only person who appears to have any–Wiglaf–is walking out into the water towards the she-demon (Angelina Jolie) with lust in his eyes in the very last scene that we see at the close. This is a Beowulf that is not only secular but also cynical. Though the dragon is slain, there is really no basis for any kind of hope at all in the movie’s imaginative world.

 

Robert Zemeckis is at least honest about his approach to retelling the story.  “Nothing about the original poem appealed to me,” he writes on the film’s website (www.beowulfmovie.com).  Quite so.  Neal Gaiman and Roger Avary profess in their screenplay to have undone the “editing” that the monks who presumably gave us our version of the story supposedly did to the original.  But their proffered “restoration” is based on no scholarship about that supposed original at all, other than the supposition that it must have existed.  (There is evidence that the story is older than the version we have, and probably did have pagan origins.  For more on the real significance of this fact, see J. R. R. Tolkien’s classic essay, “Beowulf: The Monsters and the Critics.”)

 

So what is the basis for this allegedly original version?  As I was watching the film, I kept thinking, “This movie is what you would get if you tried to morph a secular and cynical Beowulf with–of all things–C. S. Lewis’s pre-conversion epic poem Dymer.” The movie Grendel is actually Hrothgar’s illegitimate son through his illicit sexual union with the seductive demon Jolie. Beowulf has had evidence for this astounding fact presented to him before he encounters Jolie, but forgets it and repeats the same tragic mistake, so that the dragon is actually his son; and Wiglaf’s first act as the new king is apparently going to be to repeat the same pattern. It is Lewis’s myth, of the man who has to confront the monster he himself begot, on steroids. If one wanted charitably to find a positive lesson in this hopeless mishmash, it could be to “be sure that your sin will find you out.” But the problem is that, with the gods (not just including Christ, but especially Christ) having been dismissed as irrelevant, no possibility of redemption from this inevitable fate is ever held out.

 I kept thinking, “This couldn’t be an unholy marriage between Beowulf and Dymer!” But then I saw Neal Gaiman’s name in the credits. Whatever else you may say about Mr. Gaiman, he has read his Lewis–how profitably is a matter of some debate. So I am now setting it forth as a reasonable hypothesis that Dymer does have something to do with this Beowulf. If so, the end result is the worst of both worlds.  It should be seen only by the mature and spiritually fortified adult—not, despite its misleading PG-13 rating, by children of any age.  Donald T. Williams, PhD, is professor of English and Director of the School of Arts and Sciences at Toccoa Falls College in the hills of Northeast Georgia.  His most recent books are Mere Humanity: G. K. Chesterton, C. S. Lewis, and J. R. R. Tolkien on the Human Condition (Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 2006), Credo: Meditations on the Nicene Creed (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2007), and The Devil’s Dictionary of the Christian Faith (Chalice, 2008).  His website is www.doulomen.tripod.com.

Jackson’s LOTR

Don April 28th, 2009

I have a lot of things I want to talk about, so I’m going to intersperse other topics with the ongoing history of things a lifetime of trying to be a poet has taught me.

“YOU’RE NOT TELLING IT RIGHT!”  Peter Jackson’s Betrayal of J. R. R. Tolkien’s Vision in The Two Towers and The Return of the King  “If therefore they say to you, ‘Behold, he is in the wilderness,’ do not go forth, or, ‘Behold, he is in the inner rooms,’ do not believe them.”  (Mat. 24:26)

 

 INTRODUCTION            All of us who have had small children and have read or told them stories know that their appetite for hearing a favorite one again is nearly insatiable, far more insatiable, usually, than our appetite for telling it.  So we have all come to that moment when we felt that any variation at all from the familiar pattern would be a blessed relief.  So Goldilocks, after her disappointment with the first two bowls of porridge, gives up and leaves the third bowl untasted.  But we never get to the wonderfully creative new tangent this omission has made possible, for we are interrupted by the plaintive cry, “You’re not telling it right!”  Are our children hidebound purists who wish to squelch our creativity?  No.  They know the difference between making up our own story and telling one that has already been established, and they will appreciate that creativity when we exercise it in its proper sphere.  And they may not know, but they sense, that there is a good reason why Goldilocks needs to sample that third bowl, for the violation of the original pattern cannot be expected to produce really satisfactory results.  So perhaps the great tragedy of Peter Jackson’s second and third installments of his film version of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings is that his own children were too young to have yet read the original work for themselves.   GENERAL COMMENTS In The Fellowship of the Ring, the first film in the trilogy, most of the changes from Tolkien’s original tale can be defended as necessary simplifications required by the translation of the richer medium, books, into the more limited one, movies.  (I say that the book is a richer medium because it engages the reader’s imagination to help create the images rather than supplying them ready made, and because it can move at a more leisurely pace, making greater detail in the realization of the story possible.)  But, starting with the second installment, Jackson’s departures from the original story become increasingly more difficult to justify.    The problem with these movies is that Peter Jackson has done so many things so very well.  The orcs are the first I’ve seen who actually look like what they are, the twisted and deformed descendants of ruined elves.  The landscapes are mostly magnificent in their appropriateness.  The battles are well realized, if not entirely accurate. The Ents’ bodies are well portrayed, even if their character lacks the full depth that lay behind Treebeard’s eyes.  Sam Gamgee’s character, on the other hand, is drawn as perfectly as one could ask for (until one unfortunate scene in The Return of the King, of which more anon). Gollum moves and acts (mostly) like Gollum.  Meduseld is Meduseld, Orthanc is Orthanc, Minas Tirith is Minas Tirith, and Barad Dur is Barad Dur.  The acting (with the unfortunate but crucial exception of Elijah Wood’s Frodo) is mostly tolerable to good. All this is in fact done so well, at such expense, and with such profit, that it is hard to imagine that anybody will ever be given the chance to do another, more faithful version of The Lord of the Rings. So you can’t just hate it and be done with it, the way you could, say, Bakshi’s version from the ’70’s. Unfortunately, this means that our hatred of Jackson’s betrayals (of Faramir, Arwen, and Denethor, and through them of Tolkien) must therefore be all the more intense. We must be content to see the story simplified.  That is unavoidable when making any long and rich book into a movie, even a nine hour epic. So I didn’t mind Tom Bombadil disappearing or even Arwen replacing Glorfindel in the first installment. Thus, I don’t think I am being an unreasonable “purist” when I say that to change the basic nature, personality, and motivation of a major character is just unacceptable, and that to do so and still claim to be making a movie of LOTR is simply dishonest.  THE TWO TOWERS Some of the changes in The Two Towers are mere irritations. Having the Ents not make the right decision about Saruman so they have to be tricked into it by Merry and Pippin (who, according to the movie itself, could not have known about the devastation they show Treebeard because they had not passed through that part of Fangorn) was a wholly unnecessary “plothole.”  The stupid “exorcism” of Theoden (who “youthens” way too much as a result, by the way–he should still be an old man afterwards), rather than Tolkien’s more subtle scene is an irritation.  I would much rather have seen the Huorns at Helm’s Deep than to have Eomer (who was already supposed to be there) come charging up with his army, but I suppose I can live with the battle we were offered.But some of the changes are neither credible, nor acceptable, nor even tolerable. The worst sins in The Two Towers are as follows.  The first is having Arwen head off to the Grey Havens (and Aragorn believe that she is doing so), thus setting up a much deeper entanglement between Aragorn and Eowyn than Tolkien ever intended or would have tolerated.  Elrond is much too wise to try to escape his fate, however costly, and to interfere with a union that is necessary for the future of Middle Earth, through such a self serving argument.  And the idea of Arwen even considering going back on her oath to Aragorn, no matter what the cost, is just plain sickening, as is the idea that he assumes she would.  That is not the woman the king of men loved; that is not the king of men.  The second is losing the clear contrast between the characters of Boromir and Faramir–the original of whom said he “wouldn’t have picked this thing [the Ring] up if I found it lying in the road.”  Not exactly “Tell my father Faramir sends him a powerful weapon.”  Uncomplicated nobility is apparently beyond anything Jackson can imagine.  But Tolkien understood the importance of imagining it, the need for images of goodness to contrast with images of evil. The third problem is Gollum’s too easy “conversion.” It goes much farther than Tolkien ever allowed.  This is also a serious flaw, because it makes the mortal will seem much more autonomous than it is in reality.  Tolkien had a more profound vision of both good and evil than Jackson is apparently capable of. All these changes gin up superfluous dramatic conflict by sacrificing both credibility and faithfulness. THE RETURN OF THE KING The pre-release internet buzz was that Peter Jackson’s third installment of his version of the Tolkien trilogy stayed closer to the book than his The Two Towers.  That is true only in a very gross and superficial sense.  There were no new big departures from the original plot, just the inevitable workings out of the disastrous big departures made in “The Two Towers.”  But there were a thousand little changes, which, like Chinese water torture, made it almost impossible to enjoy the good things (i.e., one of the best artistic renderings of Minas Tirith ever).  These little changes also reveal, as clearly as the major departures in the second movie, the shallowness of Jackson’s understanding of Tolkien’s  Christian world view and therefore of his epic.  Once again, I say nothing here against the omissions and conflations of plot elements, as much as we would all have liked to see the scouring of the Shire.  Some simplification has to be expected in an adaptation, and anyone who won’t accept that just shouldn’t watch movies based on books.  What bothered me were the thousand and one little gratuitous changes to the original that served no good purpose.  No doubt, again, they were intended to make things more dramatic on screen and/or to bring out elements of the conflict as Jackson sees them.  But almost every one of these unnecessary changes is either a clumsy and heavy-handed treatment of themes Tolkien showed us with much greater skill and subtlety, is just plain pointless and stupid, or betrays an appalling lack of understanding of what Tolkien was doing (and why) when he wrote the story the way he did.  A few typical examples of these gratuitous changes to the plot in The Return of the King will have to suffice; no doubt you can think of many more.  One thinks of Gandalf punching out Denethor with his staff, which was simply demeaning to both characters.   The movie Denethor has none of the nobility that made his fall tragic in the book; he is just a dottering and despicable old fool.  Second, Sam beating the snot out of a supine and passive Gollum is absurd on two counts.   Not only would he have been physically incapable of this—it took both Frodo and Sam to subdue Gollum, and then only with the threat of Sting and the influence of the Ring—but, knowing that Gollum was under Frodo’s protection, it is just not something Sam would have done, no matter how strong his feelings.  It was completely out of character.   Finally,  Frodo pushing Gollum off the cliff at Sammath Naur rather than having him fall by “accident” during his celebratory dance after having retaken the Ring seriously diminishes Tolkien’s emphasis on the role of Providence (or, to use his own words, “Luck, if luck you call it”). SUMMARY Why does Peter Jackson do it? You would expect him to simplify the story–the switch to the medium of film demands that–but Jackson actually gratuitously complicates things! Two fundamental problems seem to me to lie behind these changes. First is Jackson’s failure to grasp the depths of Tolkien’s Christian world view. He cannot comprehend the depths of the hold that sin has on us–hence Smeagol telling Gollum to “leave now, and never come back.” Too easy, too simple, a clumsy handling of what Tolkien does much more believably and subtly in portraying the same inner conflict.  Gollum’s hand hesitantly reaching out to caress Frodo is more subtle, more believable (because it does not necessarily imply that Slinker and Stinker are as neatly separable as the movie’s version makes them), and, as interrupted by the misunderstanding Sam, more tragic.  Why?  Because Tolkien understood the biblical doctrine of sin too well to imagine that one can even temporarily banish one’s evil side by simply telling it to get lost. Ironically, the failure to appreciate the true depths of evil also makes it impossible for Jackson to believe in the real potential human beings have on the other side, for heroism and integrity. One’s ability to appreciate sin and capacity to understand grace inevitably go hand in hand. So good characters like Faramir (or Aragorn, or Arwen) are felt to be too good to be believable, and hence have to be “complicated.”  So we have an Aragorn who, instead of faithfully pursuing his calling, is resisting the kingship because he fears he will repeat the tragic error of Isildur.  And we have a Faramir who initially is much more like his brother than the one in the book.  As a result, the movie Faramir, like the movie Gollum, also has (ironically) a cheap and unmotivated conversion. What is it about the attack of the Nazgul at Osgiliath that suddenly makes him think it is a good idea to send Frodo and Sam off into Mordor alone?  That is a decision Tolkien’s Faramir could make in Tolkien’s scene, but not one that this Faramir can make believably in Jackson’s scene. The second underlying problem is sheer Directorial Arrogance. Here we have a book twice independently voted the book of the century, which has for more than fifty years now been loved more intensely by more readers than any other work of fiction ever written.  “So, obviously, I, Peter Jackson, have a better idea about what makes a good story and good motivations for the characters than its author did!” It’s a good thing the Greek gods don’t actually exist.  They would surely have noticed the egregious hubris in that assumption by now and be plotting a rather nasty reversal for the career of this particularly ridiculous mortal. Yet I must admit that, despite all these serious complaints, I am strangely gratified by the movies’ popularity and talk of the third being the best picture of the year, even as I am disgusted by the same phenomena for the sake of those who will only see them and not read the book and hence have a false view of many things. For there is an ironic testimony here:  Even in such an inexcusably distorted form, much of the power of Tolkien’s story still comes through. My favorite comment overheard in the theater was from two theater employees on their way in to clean up after the showing of The Two Towers. They had both apparently neither seen the films nor read the books, but commented thus: “This must be a movie that makes people think. Everybody always comes out of it very solemn.”And yet . . . and yet . . . they could and should have been so much better!  All it would have taken was a little more faithfulness, a little more trust in Tolkien’s work.  In an attempt to summarize what went wrong and what was at stake, I can do no better than to offer the following sonnet: THE QUEST MOTIF(What Lewis and Tolkien Knew,And Peter Jackson Does Not) Sonnet CI Snaking out across the vast expanse Of History and Legend lies a trail,The footing treacherous, the markings pale,And peril lies in wait for those who chanceTo travel it.  But if they can advance,And if their luck and courage do not fail, They may emerge into a mystic valeAnd reach the magic realm of fair Romance. The landscape’s always changing.  There is noMap that can be trusted once you swerveAside; your only compass is your quest.If, true to friend, implacable to foe,You’re faithful to the Vision that you serve,You’ll find that Country which the Muse has blessed. (D.T.W) One might have hoped, in other words, that Peter Jackson would have had the humility to see himself as the servant of Tolkien’s vision.  He shows us that, had he done so, he could have created a worthy adaptation that would have been a true masterpiece.  Instead, he had the arrogance—yea, hubris–to make up his own vision and think it better, while outwardly claiming to give us Tolkien’s. Tragic.     Donald T. Williams, PhD, Toccoa Falls College 

XXXVI

Don March 3rd, 2009

XXXVI Wordsworth wrote an endless poem in blank verse on” the growth of a poet’s mind.”  I shall attempt a more modest feat for a more distracted age: a blog, “Things which a Lifetime of Trying to Be a Poet has Taught Me.” 

            It is now 1973-4, my first year in theological seminary at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School north of Chicago, working on my Master of Divinity degree.  Just as I had been constantly running off to read Augustine, Calvin, Hodge, or Warfield when I was supposed to be studying English literature, so now I was constantly sneaking off to read Dante, Shakespeare, Spenser, or Milton when I was supposed to be studying theology.  I think it is the best possible approach to both subjects.

            But the autumn of 1973 saw a much more portentous event than a new set of studies: the passing of J. R. R. Tolkien, whose Lord of the Rings had helped to awaken me from my prosaic slumbers in high school.  His elegy naturally had to take the form of the laments for Gandalf given by the Company while they rested in Lorien.

 TO J. R. R. TOLKIEN 

On a day when Fall’s first leaves were flying

And the Wind was howling, and Geese were crying,

Word first came, on dark wings riding:

“Tolkien is dead!”

Was all they said,

And left us crying.

 

He heard by light of star and moon

The Elven-songs, and learned their tunes.

He had longs walks with them, and talks,

Beneath the swaying trees in June.

 

Dwarf-mines deeply delved he saw

Where Mithril glittered on the walls

And might kings wrought wondrous things

And reigned in hollow, torchlit halls.

 

To forests wild and deep he went

And many lives of men he spent

Where leaves of years fall soft like tears,

Listening to the speech of Ents.

 

In lofty halls of men he sat

Or rustic rooms of bar-man fat;

In hobbit holes heard stories told

By an old man in a wizard’s hat.

 

With magic words of Dark and Light

And days of Doom and coming Night

And magic Rings and hoped for Spring,

He wrought the record of his sight.

 

In Beowulf’s bold fleet he sailed,

With Gawain the Green Knight beheld;

By Beortnoth’s side he stood and cried,

As scores of pagan Danes he felled,

“Will shall be sterner, heart the bolder,Spirit the greater as our strength fails!” 

On a day when Fall’s first leaves were flying

And the Wind was howling, and Geese were crying,

Word first came, on dark wings riding:

“Tolkien is dead!”

Was all they said,

And left us crying.

Donald T. Williams, PhD

Critique Critiqued

Don January 13th, 2009

We take a break from the poetic history to bring you a condensation of my review forthcoming in Mythlore of an attack on Lewis that should actually be taken seriously.

C. S. LEWIS AND THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL RELIGION. Revised and Updated. John Beversluis. Amherst, N. Y.: Prometheus Books, 2007.

One of the most controversial books in Lewis studies was the first ed. of John Beversluis, C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion (Eerdmans, 1985). Billed as the only book-length critical study of Lewis’s rational apologetic, it concluded that none of his arguments succeed. The first edition sometimes gave the impression Beversluis thought accusing Lewis of a fallacy was equivalent to demonstrating he had committed it. Few who had appreciated Lewis’s apologetics were convinced.

Now we have a new revised, updated, and expanded edition. It has already caused much exultation on atheist websites and dismissive eye-rolling among Lewis fans. Neither reaction is justified.

Beversluis has rewritten his critique to the point that this version is a completely new book. In the process, he has strengthened it considerably. While I still find it mostly unconvincing, it does keep its promise to provide the strongest sustained critique of Lewis’s apologetic available. As such, it performs a valuable service. Those who wish to continue using Lewis’s arguments will have to get past Beversluis in order to do so with credibility, and they will be stronger for the exercise.

Beversluis takes seriously Lewis’s statement in MC that he does not ask anyone to accept Christianity “if his best reasoning tells him that the weight of the evidence is against it.” Beversluis wants to know if Lewis succeeded in showing that the best reasoning supports Christian faith. He concludes that Lewis fails.

Beversluis’s objections can be summarized in two points. First, the “apparent cogency of [Lewis’s] arguments depends on his rhetoric rather than on his logic” (20). Lewis was such a good writer that people are carried away by his words. Second, Lewis’s arguments are fallacious, and his besetting fallacy is the False Dilemma. Lewis will claim there are only two choices, refute one, and thus seem to leave Christian theism standing sole possessor of the field; but in reality, there are other alternatives not considered, and the one rejected is a straw man.

Clearly, Beversluis’s first criticism is valid only if the second is upheld. It is hardly a fault to write well unless that writing can be shown to be in the service of error. The second criticism will likely be debated for some time. The question will be whether the additional alternatives B tries to posit do not in fact ultimately reduce to the set of choices that Lewis’s more incisive analysis had set before us in the first place. In most cases, I think they do.

For example, Beversluis argues that Lewis’s refutation of moral subjectivism is vitiated by his treating it as a single genus, when actually “there are more sophisticated and nuanced versions that . . . cannot be disposed of so easily” (83). The example B offers is Hume’s theory of morals as based on feeling, which B claims is not susceptible to Lewis’s “loose-cannon generalizations” (87). Well, I think it is. In fact, it is doubtful whether Hume’s is properly a theory of ethics at all, as it has absolutely no answer to Lewis’s charge that subjectivist ethics is unable to account for the word “ought.” When the jargon is stripped away from the “more nuanced” views, it is not clear at all that B has made his charge of False Dilemma stick.

In the discussion of the Trilemma (“Lord/Liar/Lunatic”), the alleged missed alternatives include the possibilities that Jesus did not make the statements on which the argument is based, and that a person could be mistaken about being God and still be a great moral teacher. In the first case, B himself commits the fallacies of Hasty Generalization and Ad Verecundiam, telling us that “All mainstream New Testament scholars agree that the synoptic Gospels are . . . internally inconsistent and written by people who were not eyewitnesses” (123). All?? That generalization has never been true, and it is even less true today. (See Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony, Eerdmans, 2006, as just one counter-example. ) Surely one can be mistaken about many things, including even one’s own identity, and still be a good moral teacher. But we are asked now to believe that one could wrongly think he is the Creator of the Universe, the omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, eternal Being who thundered from Sinai, and still retain any credibility on anything else he might say! B rightly argues that Jesus’ moral statements would still be true even if he were a lunatic; but this misses the point. Lewis assumes the validity of the teaching; it is the credibility of the Teacher that is on trial. B’s “alternatives” to Lewis’s choices aren’t very impressive.

What my own best reasoning tells me is that people who want to escape Christian theism can always find a loophole that will satisfy them. Beversluis is particularly good at it. It does not follow that theism is false or that Lewis’s arguments for it are bad. Whether you agree with me or with B about Lewis’s arguments, one thing is certain: the discussion is sure to continue. I look forward to that.

Donald T. Williams

Oxford, 6/20/08

Don June 20th, 2008

Our revels now are ended.

This was our last day of class, and the students are dispersing across the British Isles and the Continent for Grand Tours before heading home. I more modestly will hang around Oxford for a few more days before “going down,” as Oxonians call the trip back home. But there are a few more items to report first.

“The Taming of the Shrew” at the Royal Shakespeare Company in Stratford last night was the best performance technically, and the worst in interpretation, that I have ever seen. All the irony and ambiguity in Petruchio’s character was lost: he was just a male chauvinist jerk who broke Katherine’s spirit with unrelenting cruelty. The audience was not left to make out the meaning of Kate’s final speach. The formerly spunky and fiery lady delivered it in a flat, lifeless manner as one who feared for her life if she didn’t say it. Petruchio’s “There’s a wench! Come, kiss me, Kate” led to her hanging limply in his arms and “submitting” to his embrace in a manner most chilling. Then in a surreal sequel added to the text, it turned out that Petruchio is really Christofero Sly raping the servant who had played his wife in the introduction when they were trying to convince the derelict wino that he was a lord. He is caught in the act, stipped naked, and
turned back out humiliated into the street.

We did some debriefing this morning in class, as the students found the production, not surprisingly, quite disturbing. What genre is “Shrew” supposed to be? I asked them. It is supposed to be a comedy. Every editor for 400 years has thought so. A comedy is a play with a happy ending. But what we saw was a tragedy. Kate and Petruchio both end up being destroyed and humiliated, and no good of any kind comes to anyone.

So the evidence of genre is that Shakespeare thought Kate’s submission was a happy ending and really did bode peace and love and quiet life. And even most secular–even most feminist–directors have not seen her losing her spunkiness at the end of the play, but rather redirecting it: she realizes that playing Petruchio’s game, letting him lead in the dance, can be a lot of fun. Some see her truly submitting, while others see irony in the last speech as if she has merely learned that a different set of techniques work better for manipulating Petruchio than other men. Either of these interpretations is legitimate in the sense that you can make a case for it and it preserves the play as a comedy. What we saw on the other hand was not an interpretation of Shakespeare’ s play but a rejection of it, a substitution of a different vision altogether. You may not like Shakespeare’ s vision, or what you think it is, but at least the audience deserve a chance to evaluate it and make up their own minds. Students who had not read or seen the play before were astonished (but releaved) to learn that the last scene was not part of the original play and that there were more positive ways of playing it–that it really could be a comedy! Let the reader and theatre goer beware.

Then I finished up Tolkien by talking about the way the themes of Providence and “Not by might” come to their climax at Sammath Naur, and how Peter Jackson’s scene, in which Frodo actually pushes Gollum off the cliff instead of his falling by accident, obscures what Tolkien was trying to say. Not by might, and not even by Frodo’s goodness, which also proves insufficient, is the Quest acheived, but ironically by Gollum’s treachery and by chance–if chance you call it. Tolkien’s habit of adding that last phrase speaks volumes.

Finally, Dr. Bauman summarized Lewis’s “‘Til we Have Faces” and then led a discussion on what kind of faces we are developing: Have we realized with Orual that we are Ungit? Are we becoming more like Ungit/Orual, one who demands the sacrifice of others, or like Psyche, one who is ready to sacrifice herself? On that note, the first Summit Summer Oxford Program came to an end. I had the last word: “And so we come to our final parting on the shores of Middle Earth. I will not say, ‘Do not weep,’ for not all tears are an evil.”

From the Dreaming Spires,

Don

Donald T. Williams, PhD, Co-Director
Summit Oxford Summer Studies Program

Oxford, 6/19/08

Don June 20th, 2008

Today Dr. Bauman finished his discussion of Reflections on the Psalms and I started talking about Tolkien and The Lord of the Rings. Though the word God never appears in the entire trilogy, the Christian worldview permeates it, though in a more subtle and deeply buried way than it does in the Narnia books. This is especially evident if you have read the creation story for Middle Earth in The Silmarillion, but it is there even without that.

Tolkien embeds the Christian worldview in his world by making innocent-sounding statements that raise unavoidable questions for those who think about what they are reading. Gandalf or other characters are constantly making statements like, “We must deal with the time we were given,” or “Another power was at work,” or “Bilbo was meant to find the Ring . . . and that is an encouraging thought.” The time we were “given,” not the time in which we find ourselves: so who “gave” it to us? If Bilbo was “meant” to find the Ring, who “meant” it? And why is this an encouraging thought? Elrond says that the Fellowship was “called” to his Council, though he did not call them. Then who did? A secular worldview, the belief that only atoms exist, will not let you say such things meaningfully. You cannot write this way without being either a Christian, confused, or dishonest; and Tolkien was neither confused nor dishonest. Living in Middle Earth raises questions to which only the Christian worldview has answers.

I also talked about Lewis as a poet. His chief ambition was to be a great poet. He was not a great poet, but he was a very good one, a careful craftsman who creates narratives full of longing and hope.

In a few minutes we leave for Stratford on Avon to visit Shakespeare’ s home town and see “The Taming of the Shrew” at the National Shakespeare Company. So I must away. More tomorrow, Deo volente.

From the Dreaming Spires,

Don

Donald T. Williams, PhD, Co-Director
Summit Oxford Summer Studies Program

Oxford, 6/18/08

Don June 20th, 2008

Today I talked about the Chronicles of Narnia. We had a wide-ranging two-hour discussion that touched on all of them but focused on two questions: the preferable order for reading them and how they relate to the new movie versions.

HarperCollins has reordered the series into chronological order, starting with The Magician’s Nephew instead of The Lion the Witch and the Wardrobe, because Lewis’s stepson Doug Gresham says that Lewis told him that was the way to read them. I offered four reasons why the original order is better the first time you read the series.

First, Lewis understood the way an epic works: you start in medias res [in the middle of things]. Then you fill in the background to that situation in a flashback, and finally finish up the story. This plunges you into the action and allows for suspense and surprises that are not possible with a straight chronological narrative. Second, starting with TMN ruins a number of passages in LWW that simply cannot have the effect on the reader that they were designed to have. When Mr. Beaver first tells the children that ‘Aslan is on the move,’ the narrater says, ‘Now, they did not know who Aslan is any more than you do.’ Not only does this comment make no sense if you have already read TMN, but it hinders the sense of mystery about Aslan that Lewis is trying to build up in that passage. Third, when Professor Kirk gives his reasons for believing Lucy, it is more effective if you do not know that he himself has already been to Narnia as Digory. This forces you to attend to the reasons and puts the burden on Lucy’s character and whether you really know in advance that such things can not happen. The impact is lessened if you know that Kirk knows, and is not himself believing and depending on the reasons for that belief that he gives. Fourth, you are deprived of several delightful surprises that come your way as the stories unfold–like finding out who Professor Kirk is and how the Lamp Post got there.

Therefore, while all serious students of Narnia should read the books chronologically at some point, it is better for us, our children, and any students we are able to influence, if we read the books in original publication order the first time. I have no reason to think Doug is lying. Therefore, either Doug misunderstood Lewis, or read more into his statement than was there, or Lewis actually did say it but was wrong. Based on my reading of Lewis as a literary critic, on my knowledge of his knowledge of literature, I think the last option the least likely.

My review of the Prince Caspian film appeared here earlier. We talked about my theory that the changes to the character of Peter are not accidental but parallel to the changes Peter Jackson made to Aragorn and Faramir in his LOTR. We live in a cynical age, and such directors fear that an unambiguous hero who does not waver in his commitment to the right will be unbelievable to their audience. But this misses the point that Lewis and Tolkien were trying to make: that it is precisely in a cynical age that we need literature to give us better role models than nature herself can. They represent a tradition that goes back to Sir Philip Sidney’s Defense of Poesy. Their directors and screenwriters unfortunately do not get that, and so their works get distorted in the translation to screen in ways that are not demanded by the new medium as such, but are more related to a failure of moral imagination in society.

Then Dr. Bauman spent an hour on Lewis’s less well known book Reflections on the Psalms. [See my website, doulomen.tripod. com, under topics for my own take on that work.] Lewis deals among other things with challenges like the imprecatory psalms, such as the one saying that the man would be happy who dashes the head of Babylonian babies against a stone. Ever the Advocatus Diaboli, Bauman started channelling Hitchens and Dawkins and the other new atheists with their belief that the Old Testament God is simply evil, a supporter of ethnic cleansing [the Amorites] and infanticide. The students had to try to defend against these attacks and to evaluate the accuracy and effectiveness of Lewis’s defense. At the end of the hour they had more questions than answers–a state in which Dr. B. loves to leave them. They’ll spend the evening shoring up the answers and come back tomorrow ready for more.

Then this afternoon we visited The Kilns, Lewis’s house, which has been restored by the C. S. Lewis Foundation to the form it was in when Lewis lived there. Behind the house is a pond where Lewis swam and a nature preserve where he loved to walk. We got a ways into the woods to a lovely clearing next to a very English looking paddock with two horses that we immediately christened Bree and Whin. ‘We’ve got to Narnia,’ the students cried. Wish you were here.

From the Dreaming Spires,

Don

Donald T. Williams, PhD, Co-Director
Summit Oxford Summer Studies Program

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